748a0967dda87661…

Preprint
ID: 5d7c0b8ed0706700120e052d2,626 bytesFirst seen Jun 24, 20261 collection

Fields

NameValue
abstractWe ask how well did the commissions used in the 2010 round of redistricting for states with three of more congressional districts perform in avoiding partisan gerrymanders of congressional districts? We answer that question with applications to each of the three independent commissions (AZ, CA, and WA) and four other commission forms (IA, NJ, NY, and VA) in place for post-2010. We take as the neutrality criterion the idea that a commission would produce a district plan that comports with a partisan outcome that could be expected from a set of approximately 10,000 computer generated plans adhering to minimalist constraints of contiguity, compactness, and equal populations. Our results indicate three of seven commissions produced suspect results that redounded to the benefit of one party or the other: pro-Democrat in Arizona; pro-Republican in New Jersey and Virginia.
abstractViews1546
approvedDate2019-09-17T13:34:30.001Z
assetFileNameBest et al_Do Redistricting Commissions Aug 22.pdf
assetFileSizeBytes1423004
assetMimeTypeapplication/pdf
assetUrlhttps://www.cambridge.org/engage/api-gateway/coe/assets/orp/resource/item/5d7c0b8ed0706700120e052d/original/do-redistricting-commissions-avoid-partisan-gerrymanders.pdf
authorIds["name:robin best","name:steve lem","name:daniel magleby","name:michael mcdonald"]
categoryIds["5ce663395846762193c9c422"]
citations0
commentsCount0
communityIdAPSA
competingInterestsDeclarationnull
contentDownloads2191
contentTypeWorking Paper
contentTypeId5ce663395846762193c9c430
doi10.33774/apsa-2019-xgt3p
doiUrlhttps://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2019-xgt3p
engageUrlhttps://www.cambridge.org/engage/coe/article-details/5d7c0b8ed0706700120e052d
eventIdnull
funders[]
gainedEthicsApprovalnull
hasCompetingInterestsnull
isLatestVersiontrue
keywords["gerrymander"," redistricting commission"]
licenseId5cc9d9bf7d4e0000ac04ef23
publishedDate2019-09-17T13:34:30.018Z
statusPUBLISHED
statusDate2019-09-17T13:34:30.018Z
subjectId5e68cb1bd1f19d49ce3ac752
submittedDate2019-09-13T21:49:40.157Z
supplementaryFiles[]
thumbnailUrlhttps://www.cambridge.org/engage/api-gateway/coe/assets/orp/resource/item/5d7c0b8ed0706700120e052d/mediumThumb/do-redistricting-commissions-avoid-partisan-gerrymanders.jpg
titleDo Redistricting Commissions Avoid Partisan Gerrymanders?
version1
vor{"url":"https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211053216","vorDoi":"10.1177/1532673X211053216"}
webLinks[]

Canonical JSON

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    "abstract": "We ask how well did the commissions used in the 2010 round of redistricting for states with three of more congressional districts perform in avoiding partisan gerrymanders of congressional districts? We answer that question with applications to each of the three independent commissions (AZ, CA, and WA) and four other commission forms (IA, NJ, NY, and VA) in place for post-2010. We take as the neutrality criterion the idea that a commission would produce a district plan that comports with a partisan outcome that could be expected from a set of approximately 10,000 computer generated plans adhering to minimalist constraints of contiguity, compactness, and equal populations. Our results indicate three of seven commissions produced suspect results that redounded to the benefit of one party or the other: pro-Democrat in Arizona; pro-Republican in New Jersey and Virginia.",
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Appears in 1 collection

cambridge-up/open-engage1 version · Jun 24, 2026

Full hash:748a0967dda876617e7f1941dfa88f219cd38fd2cdc5005a175b1444fcae0216