998c07a1a56407de…

Preprint
ID: 5dab57a5a6490200117d29bc2,795 bytesFirst seen Jun 24, 20261 collection

Fields

NameValue
abstractPoliticians and scholars contend that governmental transparency reforms constrain politicians' capacity to negotiate and compromise in the pursuit of policy goals. However, existing research primarily emphasizes only that governments are strategic in adopting these reforms; whether lawmakers actually incur the alleged costs of transparency remains an open question. We investigate this issue in the context of American state legislatures, many of which have become exempt from "sunshine laws" in recent decades. Legislators justify these exemptions by claiming that transparency impedes deal-making and coalition-building, producing gridlock. We leverage variation in the timing of sunshine law adoptions and exemptions to identify their effect on legislative productivity, polarization, partisanship, policy change, and budget delay. Our analyses refute legislators' argument for opacity; we report precisely-estimated negligible and contradictory effects of sunshine law exposure. We conclude that transparency does not inhibit political compromise. Legislative deliberation is equally or perhaps more effective under open governance requirements.
abstractViews1325
approvedDate2019-10-21T13:24:20.507Z
assetFileNameHarden and Kirkland -- Transparency and Compromise 9-10-19.pdf
assetFileSizeBytes2566272
assetMimeTypeapplication/pdf
assetUrlhttps://www.cambridge.org/engage/api-gateway/coe/assets/orp/resource/item/5dab57a5a6490200117d29bc/original/does-transparency-inhibit-political-compromise.pdf
authorIds["orcid:0000-0001-5337-7918","name:justin kirkland"]
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citations1
commentsCount0
communityIdAPSA
competingInterestsDeclarationnull
contentDownloads1047
contentTypeWorking Paper
contentTypeId5ce663395846762193c9c430
doi10.33774/apsa-2019-tdw2r
doiUrlhttps://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2019-tdw2r
engageUrlhttps://www.cambridge.org/engage/coe/article-details/5dab57a5a6490200117d29bc
eventIdnull
funders[]
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licenseId5cc9d9bf7d4e0000ac04ef27
publishedDate2019-10-21T13:24:20.521Z
statusPUBLISHED
statusDate2019-10-21T13:24:20.521Z
subjectId5e68cb1bd1f19d49ce3ac752
submittedDate2019-10-19T18:42:39.873Z
supplementaryFiles[]
thumbnailUrlhttps://www.cambridge.org/engage/api-gateway/coe/assets/orp/resource/item/5dab57a5a6490200117d29bc/mediumThumb/does-transparency-inhibit-political-compromise.jpg
titleDoes Transparency Inhibit Political Compromise?
version1
vor{"url":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12564","vorDoi":"10.1111/ajps.12564"}
webLinks[]

Canonical JSON

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    "abstract": "Politicians and scholars contend that governmental transparency reforms constrain politicians' capacity to negotiate and compromise in the pursuit of policy goals. However, existing research primarily emphasizes only that governments are strategic in adopting these reforms; whether lawmakers actually incur the alleged costs of transparency remains an open question. We investigate this issue in the context of American state legislatures, many of which have become exempt from \"sunshine laws\" in recent decades. Legislators justify these exemptions by claiming that transparency impedes deal-making and coalition-building, producing gridlock. We leverage variation in the timing of sunshine law adoptions and exemptions to identify their effect on legislative productivity, polarization, partisanship, policy change, and budget delay. Our analyses refute legislators' argument for opacity; we report precisely-estimated negligible and contradictory effects of sunshine law exposure. We conclude that transparency does not inhibit political compromise. Legislative deliberation is equally or perhaps more effective under open governance requirements.",
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Appears in 1 collection

cambridge-up/open-engage1 version · Jun 24, 2026

Full hash:998c07a1a56407de34ef9d642ac49aab9868cbb059170008f12f846591c55722